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When a company decides to invest abroad, it can do it through the establishment of a new 
firm (greenfield investment) or by the purchase of an already existing firm. Although there is 
a vast empirical literature on the macroeconomic determinants of aggregate FDI, there are just 
a few studies examining the location-specific determinants of each entry mode. The aim of 
this study  is to extend the  previous work by  Globerman and  Shapiro (2005)  through the 
analysis of panel data of 53 countries over the period 1996-2006, in order to identify the 
potential  location-specific  determinants  of  both  M&A  and  greenfields.    We  have  found 
evidence that there is a group of mode-encompassing variables which are common to all entry 
modes (such as economy’s size, openness, governance and human development index) and 
mode-specific  variables.  Investor’s  protection  and  cultural  variables  seem  to  play  an 
important role in the explanation of M&A and greenfields, respectively. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 When  a  company  decides  to  invest  abroad,  it  can  do  it  in  two  different  ways:  i) 
through the establishment of a greenfield investment in new asset in a foreign country, ii) or 
through an investment by acquiring a pre-existent foreign firm or merging with a foreign firm. 
Therefore,  the  two  main  components  of  Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI)  are  greenfield 
investments and mergers and acquisitions (M&A
1).  
We have witnessed, since the 90s, a massive increase on the volume of FDI, which has 
gained a major role in the process of economic growth. The internationalization of production 
allowed companies to explore their competitive advantages, led to the rise of competition, the 
increase in technology progress and the promotion of technology transfer.  Consequently, 
literature  on  international  business  has  been  focused  on  identifying  and  assessing  the 
determinants of FDI flows. Most studies, in this area, have been trying to find the key factors 
of FDI inflows and outflows, raising one of two central questions: i) why a company decides 
to  invest  abroad,  i.e.,  why  FDI  outflows  occurs;  ii)  or  which  factors  make  certain  local 
attractive to FDI, i.e., why the FDI inflows are specific of certain countries. The first question 
is usually developed in a microeconomic perspective, bearing in mind the specific assets of 
the  companies  in  the  context  of  FDI  decisions.  The  second  question  is  related  with  the 
location  determinants  of  FDI  and  with  the  characteristics  of  the  host  countries,  which  is 
studied in a macroeconomic perspective.  
The  empirical  studies  carried  out  at  country  and  industry  levels,  have  been 
concentrated on overall FDI, without distinguishing between the different modes of foreign 
investment. Actually, the studies focussed on the aggregate FDI inflows and outflows assume, 
implicitly, that the same factors influence all modes of FDI [Lall (2002)].  
On  the  other  hand,  international  M&A  make  up  the most  important  means  which 
companies use to attain the strategic aim of growth and are considered as the key mode of 
FDI, since the late 80s [UNCTAD (2006)].  
However, it is important to state that, although there are several studies about the 
macroeconomic determinants of the aggregate FDI, very few of them have clearly focused on 
the determinants of FDI via M&A [Rossi and Volpin (2004), Globerman and Shapiro (2005), 
di Giovanni (2005), Aminiam and Campart (2005)] or via greenfield investments. 
                                                
1  We  use  the  term  “M&A”  without  distinction  between  “mergers”  and  “acquisitions”.  In  fact,  acquisitions 
dominate cross border M&A transactions.  
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In fact, after the literature review, we have concluded that most of the studies on the 
determinants of M&A or greenfields use a microeconomic perspective, trying to understand 
the companies’ strategic decision on their foreign market entry. 
Our approach consists on a different analysis. Therefore it is our main goal to study 
the macroeconomic determinants of cross border M&A and greenfield investments. 
In  this  study,  our  primary  interest  is  to  evaluate  the  existence  of  mode-specific 
variables;  these  are  location-specific  variables  that can  influence  in  a  distinctive  way  the 
preference given to one entry mode instead of another. In order to accomplish that, we have 
compared the estimated results for the inward FDI, M&A and greenfields equations and the 
outward FDI, M&A and greenfields. Although differences in the determinants of the inward 
and outward flows are also of some interest, they could help us to explain the empirical 
evidence, in which the most investor’s countries are also the principal recipients. 
Therefore, we have adopted as a basis the former study by Globerman and Shapiro 
(2005) who tried to find the location-specific determinants of cross border M&A. However, 
our study has two distinctive features. The first difference is that we will use a panel data of 
53 countries, instead of a cross-section sample, over the period 1996-2006. And secondly, we 
will  extend  our  analysis  to  the  location-specific  determinants  of  greenfield  investments. 
Therefore, besides FDI and M&A in(out)flows, we will also include two additional equations 
associated with greenfield’s in(out)bound.  
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  an  overview  of  the  relevant 
literature. The sample selection and the model are explained in section 3. The main results of 
the study and the conclusions are presented in section 4 and 5, respectively.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
  Theoretically the analysis of the location determinants of FDI has been developed and 
modeled within the neoclassical and trade theory framework
2. Empirically there have been a 
quite  substantial  number  of  studies,  since  the  early  50s,  which  has  been  focusing  in  the 
analysis  of  mainly  US  outward  FDI  in  different  recipient  countries
3.  Labour  costs, 
infrastructure  quality,  openness,  market  size  and  economic  growth  seem  to  influence  the 
decision where to invest [Culem (1988); Biswas (2002); Kyrkilis and Pantelis (2003)]. 
                                                
2 See for example Krugman (1991); Markusen and Venables (1998) and Venables (1999). 
3 See Dunning (1993), Caves (1996), Chakrabarti (2001) and Blonigen (2005) for an update of the literature on 
FDI determinants.  
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  Although  there  have  been  many  empirical  studies  that  examine  the  location 
determinants  of  aggregate  FDI,  relatively  few  have  focused  explicitly  on  identifying  the 
determinants of FDI flows through the M&A mode [Rossi and Volpin (2004); Globerman and 
Shapiro (2005); di Giovanni (2005); Aminiam and Campart (2005)] or through greenfield, at 
country level. 
   A  large  number  of  studies  identify,  at  a  conceptual  level,  potential  mode-specific 
determinants. Still others provide empirical evidence on FDI mode choice using samples of 
individual firms rather than using data at the country level.   
Empirical  evidence  on  the  relevance  of  macroeconomic  determinants  of  M&A  or 
greenfields is indirectly supplied by studies of FDI entry mode choice [e.g. Kogut and Singh 
(1988);  Andersson  and  Svensson  (1994);  Hennart  and  Reddy  (1997);  Barkema  and 
Vermeulen (1998); Brouthers and Brouthers (2000); Harzing (2002) and Brouthers (2002)]. 
Such studies typically identify firm-specific factors conditioning the choice of FDI entry. 
However, to the extent that the characteristics identified differ across populations of firms in 
various home and host countries, they could contribute to potential differences in location-
specific  differences  across  home  and  host  country  firms  in  choosing  the  M&A  mode  in 
detriment of greenfield investments [Globerman and Shapiro (2005)].  
The majority of the research suggests that the choice of a cross border M&A as a 
mode of entry into a foreign market is often influenced by: (1) firm-level factors such as 
multinational experience; local experience; product diversity and international strategy; (2) 
industry-level factors such as technological intensity, advertising intensity and sales force 
intensity; and (3) country-level factors such as market size and growth in the host country, 
cultural  differences between the home and host countries, and  the  specific culture of the 
acquiring  firm’s  home  country  (namely  in  terms  of  uncertainty  avoidance  and  risk 
propensity). In table 1 we attempt to systematize empirical research that has been done about 
FDI entry modes determinants. 
(Insert table 1) 
  As  it  has  been  stated  before,  few  studies  have  been  done  to  the  analysis  of 
macroeconomic determinants of cross border M&A and greenfield investments. Actually, as 
far as greenfields is concerned, the only available studies are at the firm level. 
  Recently, some works have been published on the location-specific determinants of 
M&A. 
Globerman  and  Shapiro  (2005)  specify  and  estimate  econometric  models  of  the 
determinants of the inward and outward M&A in a 154 countries sample, across the period  
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1995-2001. Using the data published by UNCTAD, the authors identify variables that are 
potentially M&A mode-specific. They conclude, however, that in general, the most important 
variables which influence inward and outward M&A are the same that really influence the 
overall FDI.  However, there are some differences in the structure of M&A and the models of 
aggregate FDI. In particular, the economic growth is an important determinant of aggregate 
FDI, but not of the M&A flows. 
  Another study on cross border M&A was performed by Evenett (2003), who evaluate, 
in banking system, the effect of US acquisitions in 13 OECD countries. The author presented 
evidence that the US acquisitions depended on a group of characteristics of the target country, 
namely: gross domestic product (GDP), distance from the United States, corporate tax rate, 
average tariff rate and legal system. 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) reported the results of an econometric study of cross-country 
determinants of international and domestic M&A. They found that firms in countries with 
weaker investor protection are more likely to be acquired than those in countries with stronger 
investor protection, whereas buyers are more likely to be from countries with relatively strong 
investor protection.  
More  recently,  there  have  come  out  a  number  of  studies  that  include  financial 
variables as determinants of international M&A. di Giovanni (2005) used the gravitational 
model to estimate the macroeconomic determinants in international M&A during the period 
1990-1999 based on a large panel data sample. The author estimated the importance of several 
macroeconomic,  financial  and  institutional  variables  in  the  explanation  of  these  flows  of 
international M&A. In particular, he realised that the size of the financial market measured by 
ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP has a strong positive correlation to M&A. This 
result  reinforces  the  importance  of  domestic  financial  conditions  in  the  stimulus  of 
international investments, during the boom of the 90s. Additionally, he concluded that M&A 
flows tend to increase when directed to large economies with the same official language.   
Aminian and Campart (2005) have also developed a gravitational model to analyse the 
macroeconomic  determinants  of all  the  M&A between  Europe  and  Asia announced from 
1/1/1999 to 31/12/2004. The authors identified some factors underlying the activity of M&A, 
such  as  the  degree  of  openness,  the  exchange  rates  and,  just  as  di  Giovanni  (2005),  the 
financial deepness, measured by ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. 
Kamaly (2007) used a dynamic panel model to study the macroeconomic determinants 
of M&A in developing countries in the 1990s. The results show that the international interest 
rate affects the M&A in the anticipated negative direction and the openness has a positive  
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effect, but quantitatively its effect is minimal. On the contrary, the author confirmed that 
depreciation in the domestic exchange rate affects strongly and positively affects M&A in 
developing countries. Finally, and unexpectedly, the author concluded that a high level of 
activity and  deepness of the stock market  in developing countries reduces the amount  of 
M&A directed to these same countries. This is an unexpected result once the majority of 
empirical  research  using  data  from  the  US  has  confirmed,  most  of  the  times,  a  positive 
connection between the stock revenue and M&A [di Giovanni (2005)]. 
To sum up, literature suggests that, while some characteristics seem to be relevant to 
all the entry modes of FDI, (mode-encompassing), there can be specific-location determinants 
(mode-specificity) that make, for example, M&A more attractive than greenfield, or vice-
versa. In the next section we will define the data and the methodology used. 
 
3. DATA SELECTION AND MODEL 
Our empirical investigation consists in specifying and estimates six different equations 
to  identify  the  cross  country  determinants  of  FDI,  M&A  and  greenfields  inflows  and 
outflows. 
  To this purpose, we will extended the empirical model adopted by Globerman and 
Shapiro (2005), to test if there are, besides M&A mode-specific determinants, variables which 
are greenfields mode-specific. 
  Based on the specification of the model described in the next sub-section, we intend to 
test if the potential specific M&A and greenfields’ variables are only statistically significant 
in the M&A and greenfields’ equations, respectively. We are interested in identifying the 
mode-specific variables. That is, we will speculate about the existence of entry mode specific 
variables; these variables only explain each entry mode and do not determine the flows of the 
overall FDI.   
Following the identification of the aims of the investigation, it is necessary to define 
the data and the methodology used in our model estimation. 
 
3.1 Data Selection 
Since  our  goal  consists  in  the  investigation  of  the  mode-specific  variables  at  the 
country level, we have chosen to include in the sample a reasonable diversity of countries, 
both developing and developed countries. 
Unlike  Globerman  and  Shapiro  (2005)  who  have  included  in  their  analysis  154 
countries, that is, the all group of countries available by UNCTAD database, we have decided  
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to carefully select some countries. So, in the final sample, we have only included the countries 
that, in the majority of the sample years, observed in(out)flows of  FDI, M&A and greenfields 
different from zero. This criterion allowed us to obtain a 53 countries sample, as described in 
table 2. 
(Insert table 2) 
In spite of the possibility of a biased sample, this criterion allowed us to exclude a 
group of countries that didn’t show relevant M&A and greenfields, during the sample period. 
We selected 53 countries over the period 1996-2006. Nevertheless, for inward and 
outward greenfield investments, we could only cover the period 2002 to 2006, once we do not 
have the data for the previous years. Therefore, we have a panel data model, with 53 cross 
section observations (countries), distributed over 11 years, for FDI and M&A flows, and 5 
years, for greenfields. 
The database we will use for the dependent variables was recently made available and 
published by UNCTAD
4 on FDI, which allows us to make comparisons between those types 
of variables. 
This database covers the inflows (inbound investment) of foreign direct investment 
and  the  outflows  (outbound  investment)  of  FDI  for  a  great  number  of  developed  and 
developing countries, over several years. It allows, also, the analysis of both cross border 
acquisitions  of  domestic  companies  (inbound)  and  cross  border  purchases  by  domestic 
companies (outbound). For greenfields projects, UNCTAD only made available the number 
(not flows) of greenfields that each country has realized and has been recipient and it is only 
from 2002 onwards, as stated before. 
In a short way, we will compile data of the six series related to the in(out)bound of 
aggregate FDI, cross border M&A and greenfield investments, in 53 countries over the period 
1996-2006 (2002-2005, for greenfields). 
In table 3 we summarize the broad characteristics of FDI data series. The values, in 
US dollars, of the total FDI and cross border M&A are expressed as natural logarithms. As for 
the  greenfields,  the  values  refer  to  the  number  of  investment  projects,  also  in  natural 
logarithms. However, because there are two different units, it is not possible to compare the 6 
variables in a direct way. 
(Insert table 3) 
                                                
4 Through UNCTAD annual publication - World Investment Report (WIR) or through FDI/TNC Database.  
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We can then observe that the 6 variables are strongly correlated, especially between 
the FDI and M&A flows, probably due to the fact that greenfields are expressed in a different 
unit. Therefore, countries that show high flows of inflows (outflows) of FDI are, in average, 
more likely to observe large amounts of cross border sales (purchases) of companies, and 
also, be the destination (source) of large number of greenfields. 
On the other hand, empirical evidence suggests that FDI growth since 2004, just like 
what had happened in the late 90s, has been done exclusively on the account of international 
M&A
5. There is also evidence of diverging growth tendencies between the series of M&A 
and greenfields, which is not surprising, once companies tend to consider these two entry 
modes as alternative options.  
As far as FDI and M&A flows is concerned (because these are the ones we can make 
direct comparisons), data also suggests that both the inflows and outflows of FDI are less 
concentrated than M&A flows.The variance of the logarithmic outcomes is often used as a 
measure of concentration [Globerman and Shapiro (2005)]. The variance of the logarithm of 
FDI series is lower than that of inbound M&A (IN-M&A), and that of FDO series is lower 
than the outbound M&A series (OUT-M&A). Consequently, we can suggest that cross border 
M&A activity, both inward and outward, is therefore concentrated among a smaller number 
of countries compared to FDI and FDO.  
In short, given the importance of M&A activity as a source of FDI, and given the high 
correlation between the 6 variables, we are expecting to find strong similarities between the 
estimated equations for aggregate FDI and for the ones related to the two alternative entry 
modes. 
  However, there are significant differences between the three series, and we hope these 
differences can reflect the specific advantages of each country, which may be identifiable 
through the econometric analysis. 
On the next section, all the variables will be described in detail. 
 
4.2 Model 
  Besides the use of panel data sample, we believe that another feature that will allow 
us to deepen the analysis by Globerman and Shapiro (2005), consists in adding to their four 
regressions  (two  for  FDI  and  two  for  cross  border  M&A)  another  two,  related  to  the 
greenfield investments. 
                                                
5 UNCTAD (2006), WIR.  
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We will introduce two new regressions so that we will be able to incorporate the cross-
country determinants of greenfields, and, consequently, we will estimate six separate groups 
of equations that obey to this general model: 
Yit = β0 + β1 GDPit+ β2 GDPGROWTHit-1+ β3 GI it + β4 OPENNESS it +...+ β4 Xit + u it    (1)
 
 i = 1, 2,….53 countries 
t = 1996, 1997,….., 2006 
Yit represents each one of the 6 dependent variables described before, for the country i 
in the year t, i.e., the inflows and outflows of FDI, international M&A and the number of 
greenfields projects that country i was the destination or the source, in the year t
6. Variable X 
represents the vector of control variables that will measure the location variables specific to 
each entry mode. 
The  other  variables  present  in  the  model  (GDP  –  Gross  Domestic  Product; 
GDPGROWTH – GDP Annual Growth Rate; GI – Governance Index and OPENNESS – 
Degree of Openness) are some of the explanatory variables that we intend to test, as being 
those that conceptually affect, equally, all the modes of FDI.  
Unlike Globerman and Shapiro (2005) we will estimate those regressions in a panel 
data  context  and  we  will  choose  the  methodology  that,  according  to  us,  is  the  most 
appropriate.  
The panel data analysis allows us to obtain more observations, more data variability, a 
greater number of freedom degrees, less multicollinearity problems, and so, a better estimate 
efficiency. In fact, these factors make up some of the advantages of using a panel data instead 
of using a cross-section analysis. Using a panel data allows us to combine the diversity of 
individual  behaviours  with  the  existence  of  dynamic  adjustments  [Marques  (2000)].  The 
principal  advantage  of  estimating  with  panel  data  is,  with  no  doubt,  the  revelation  of 
individual heterogeneity, which is often neglected in cross or time-section estimates, giving 
origin to biased results (Verbeek (2004) e Baltagi (1995)).  This heterogeneity is captured by 
the fixed specific effects of the individuals (countries, in this case) or by the components of 
random effects, depending on the characteristics of the sample. 
To sum up, the panel analysis might enrich the empirical research in a way that could 
not be possible if we used only time or cross section samples [Gujarati (2006)]. This is, in 
fact, the main reason why we decided to choose this type of analysis, in detriment of the one 
by Globerman and Shapiro (2005). 
                                                
6 The model is specified such that both dependent variables and GDP are measured in logarithms, with GDP 
coefficient measuring the elasticity of FDI series.  
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We will use the fixed effects model (FEM)
 7 and the random effects models (REM) for 
the estimation of our panel data. Another possibility consists in using dynamic models, but, 
because it would take six consecutive years so that a country could be included [Gaud et al. 
(2005)] and, because in the greenfield’s series we only have data from 2002 to 2006, we 
chose not to use this methodology in our work. 
In order to choose the most appropriate estimator, we will use a statistic test, namely 
Hausman Test (1978). The Hausman statistic tests the null hypothesis that REM is appropriate 
for a particular sample compared to the FEM and allows us to decide which model gives the 
best estimation. The Hausman test allows verifying the presence of correlation between the 
unobservable heterogeneity and the explanatory variables [Wooldridge (2002)]
8. Additionally, 
we will present standard errors corrected for heterocedasticity and covariance based on the 
White’s (1980) heterocedasticity-consistent standard errors method
9.  
For each equation we have done a variety of alternative specifications, in order to 
assess the isolated effect of some variables. The problem of multicollinearity, which is usually 
reduced by the use of panel data, has become clear in some situations where the correlation of 
the explanatory variables was high
10, leading us to specify equations in which those variables 
were regressed separately. 
 
4.2.1 Variables Specification 
4.2.1.1 Mode-Encompasing Variables 
  In the specification of the explanatory variables, we will use, as a theoretical base, the 
studies related with FDI and entry mode determinants and, also, the studies that have recently 
focused  on  macroeconomic  determinants  of  M&A,  in  particular,  the  Globerman  and 
Shapiro’(2005) work. 
                                                
7 The fixed effects method is also know as Covariance Analysis or Dummy Variables Model. This model can 
also be interpreted as a classic regression model. If N is small enough, then the model can be estimated by OLS 
with the same regressors and dummy variables indicating the different countries (to identify the firms effect), the 
different years (to identify the period effect), or both of them [Greene (2000, p. 561]. 
8 This consists of comparing the coefficients of the estimates for FEM and the estimates for REM. The null 
hypothesis is that the coefficients on both models are quite similar. If the coefficients differ from each other, the 
fixed effects estimation is simultaneously consistent and efficient. Consequently, if we do not reject the null 
hypothesis, we will interpret the REM results. On the other hand, if we reject the null hypothesis, we will 
analyze the FEM results.  
9  Violation  of  the  assumption  that  the  residuals  are  homocedastic  has  potentially  serious  implications  on 
inferences based on these results. Thus, the application of panel data regressions, ignoring the possibility of a 
non-constant disturbance variance (heteroscedasticity) would lead to estimators that are unbiased and consistent 
but no longer efficient. 
10 See Table 5 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables.  
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  Mode-encompassing variables are those which we hope influence FDI, no matter the 
entry mode adopted in foreign markets.  
  Like Rossi and Volpin (2004), we will include in the analysis the size of the economy 
using as a proxy the natural logarithm of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its growth rate 
(GDPGROWTH) as two variables susceptible of increasing the aggregate FDI.  
  It is expected that large markets are capable of attracting FDI due to economies of 
scale in production and distribution for goods sold in the host countries. On the other hand, 
large markets are, very often, associated with agglomeration economies that reduce the costs 
for all producers in that market. Conceptually, these advantages increase the possibility of 
inward FDI, regardless of mode. 
Simultaneously, multinationals located in large markets, are more inclined to invest 
abroad  because  their  position  in  a  large  domestic  economy  brings  them  firm-specific 
advantages. Kyrkilis e Pantelidis (2003), while studying the macroeconomic determinants of 
outward FDI, proved that the GDP is truly the most important factor in explaining these 
flows.  
The growth of GDP (GDPGROWTH) will be included to capture future economic 
opportunities  and  the  existence  of  economic  rents  [Globerman  and  Shapiro  (2005)]. 
Specifically,  a  fast  economic  growth  can  contribute  to  some  instability  in  the  inputs  and 
outputs markets that created above average profit potential for investors who identify those 
opportunities and possess the resources to exploit those opportunities. That is why we expect 
the growth of economy is positively related to the three variables that measure capital inflows 
[Serven and Solimano (1993), Culem (1988), Globerman and Shapiro (2005)].  
As for the relation between GDP growth and outward FDI, Globerman and Shapiro 
(2005) showed a negative correlation. According to these authors, a growing economy attracts 
not only foreign investors but it also encourages domestic companies to invest locally.  
Actually, we believe that the growth of GDP in the previous year causes a rise in the 
economy  that  will  then  stimulate  local  production.  However,  this  market  will  be  more 
saturated, due to internal competition, and, consequently, local companies will tend to invest 
abroad in order to avoid local competition [Bae and Hwang (1997)]. In fact, this seems to be 
the tendency observed in large developing countries
11, namely China and India, where the fast 
economic growth “(...) is causing them concern about running short of key resources and 
inputs for their economic expansion” [UNCTAD (2006: 164] and foreign investment comes 
                                                
11 The FDI from developing and transition economies reached $ 133 billions, in 2005, accounting for 17% of 
world FDI outflows [UNCTAD (2006)].  
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as a viable strategy. Unlike Globerman and Shapiro (2005), our hypothesis predicts that a 
rapid economic growth causes a rise in local markets competition, which leads to a saturation 
point and induces to a growth in outward FDI. 
As for the variable governance environment (GI) it is expected that it affects both FDI 
and FDO flows, as stated by Globerman and Shapiro (2005).  
Specifically, we can expect that “well governed” host countries attract more inward 
FDI  compared  to  other  countries  that  offer  “less  attractive”  environments  for  private 
investment. Similarly, “well governed” countries can be expected to spawn companies with 
the  capabilities  to  be  competitive  in  foreign  markets.  This  variable  associated  with 
governance infrastructure refers to a country’s political, institutional an legal environment and 
it will be attained from a broad composite index that encompasses a wide diversity composed 
of  country  specific  features,  such  as  political  instability,  macroeconomic  and  regulatory 
policies,  rule  of  law  and  the  extent  of  corruption.  Governance  index  is  also  likely  to  be 
relevant to all the modes of FDI, including M&A and greenfields. 
This broad measure we intend to use, following Globerman and Shapiro (2005), was 
initially developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) and it has been, over the 
time, constantly updated and expanded by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (KKM) (2007). In 
the  estimation,  we  will  use  an  aggregate  GI  measure,  through  the  calculus  of  a  simple 
arithmetic  average  of  the  6  sub-indices  associated  with  the  country’s  governance  index 
(political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule 
of law; control of corruption and voice and accountability). 
Another FDI determinant is the Human Development Index (HDI), available by the 
United Nations. This index is composed of three sub-indices: GDP per capita, educational 
literacy  and  enrolment  and  life  expectancy  at  birth.  While,  the  health  and  education 
components are direct measures of human capital, the GDP per capita is a measure of wealth 
that we will use as a proxy measure for the amount of physical infrastructure
12. 
Consequently, this index gives us an indication of the level of physical and human 
infrastructures  in  a  given  country,  which  we  expect  to  be  positively  related  to  the  FDI 
outflows. We expect these factors to be associated to the ability of companies to create firm-
specific  advantages;  these  advantages  have  been  identified  as  necessary  to  international 
production [Dunning (1993), Caves  (1996)]. That  is the reason  why  we will include this 
variable only in the three equations related to FDI, de M&A and greenfields outflows. 
                                                
12 Rossi e Volpin (2004) used in their study the GDP per capita as a proxy of countries’ wealth.  
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Additionally, we intend to include the degree of openness (OPENNESS) measured by 
the sum of exports and imports to the country’s GDP. This variable is often used as a proxy to 
country’s trade restrictions. 
So, our  hypothesis predicts that  countries which  exhibit higher levels  of  openness  
tends to attract more foreign investment, due to the reduction of trading costs. Actually, the 
most common argument is that a high degree of openness encourages either FDI or trading 
flows [e.g. Culem (1988), Janicki e Wunnava (2004)]. Consequently, a positive sign between 
the  degree  of  openness  degree  and  inward  investments  will  be  expected.  Some  studies, 
namely  those  by  Aminian  and  Campart  (2005)  and  Kamaly  (2007)  refer,  likewise,  the 
importance of this variable in explaining the activity of intermational M&A. 
Kyrkilis  and  Pantelis  (2003)  refer  that  the  liberalization  of  international  economic 
trade in a country is expected to positively influence the outflows of all kinds of investments. 
First, the absence of capital controls allows the unrestricted funding of investments abroad. 
Second, an export-oriented economy permits firms to acquire relevant information relevant 
about foreign markets (knowledge, skills about organising foreign operations and marketing 
their products internationally). Finally, companies can choose to combat import competition 
through their involvement in the home markets of the import producing firms and a certain 
mode of retaliation is FDI.  
We could have also introduced other variables such as the inflation rate, the country 
corporate tax and the labour cost. However, since the principal aim of this study is not to 
investigate the determinants of aggregate FDI, we chose not to include any more FDI mode-
encompassing variables. 
 
4.2.1.2 Mode-Specific Variables 
  From the potential variables that make M&A more attractive, the most obvious are 
those related to the liquidity and the efficiency of capital markets.  
  Like  Globerman  and  Shapiro  (2005),  we  intend  to  use  the  ratio  of  stock  market 
capitalization to GDP (CAP), as one of the possible liquidity measures of those markets, and 
we hope that both acquisitions and sales of domestic companies are positively correlated to 
the markets liquidity. In the same way, di Giovanni (2005) and Aminian and Campart (2005) 
introduced this variable as an indicator of the size of the financial markets and observed a 
strong positive correlation between this and international M&A activity. 
  As an indirect measure of the markets efficiency, we will use, as suggested by Rossi 
and Volpin (2004), the investor protection index (INVPROT), defined as an interaction of an  
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index of shareholders rights with an index of the rule of law. Both indices were defined, 
previously, by LaPorta et al. (1998) and later, extended to transition economies by Pistor et 
al. (2000). 
  According to Rossi and Volpin (2004) international M&A may be facilitaded by legal 
systems  and  degree  of  investor  protection  in  both  home  and  host  countries.  Particularly, 
LaPorta  et  al.  (1998)  claim  that  the  countries  whose  legal  system  originates  in  English 
Common Law are those who offer better shareholder protection, better protection of property 
rights protection and are more flexible to cope with economic changes, thereby offering better  
financial  intermediation.  So,  a  country’s  legal  system  has  been  identified  as  a  critical 
determinant for the development of financial markets. Also, the shareholders protection has 
been associated to those markets [LaPorta et al. (1997 and 2000)]
13.   
  To  sum  up,  we  will  use  two  variables  capable  of  influencing  the  country’  M&A 
activity, namely: 1) the stock market capitalization as an indicator of the liquidity and size of 
the capital markets and  2) the investor protection index, as a proxy of the efficiency of these 
markets. These variables will be added to the 6 suggested equations and we expect them to be 
significant only in the M&A equations. 
  In the specification of greenfields specific variables, we will have to rely on the firm-
studies of entry mode choice. Since the empirical research on greenfields macroeconomic 
determinants  is  almost  inexistent,  we  have  decided  to  consider  only  the  country-level 
variables that were included in the firm-studies of entry mode choice.
14  
  According to Kogut and Singh (1988), cultural factors can be pointed as the country-
specific determinants which will have a greater impact in the choice of entry mode. According 
to these, the number of greenfield projects tends to increase with cultural distance. On the 
contrary, M&A activity tends to diminish with cultural distance, as the risk associated to the 
process of integration post-fusion will be higher. The authors believe that cultural context 
tends to be an indicator of the risk level of the country. Similar conclusions were drawn by 
Hennart and Reddy (1997), Harzing (2002) and Barkema and Vermeulen (1998). 
Taking as a base the pioneer work by Kogut and Singh (1988) on the importance of 
cultural factors, we intend to test if these are positively correlated to greenfields. 
                                                
13 The introduction of a dummy variable for the legal system, which would assume the value 1 if the country had 
a legal system based on commom law, and zero, otherwise, doesn’t allow us to estimate the regressions by the 
Fixed Effects Method (FEM). As this variable would, in most of the cases, be zero, the FEM couldn’t capture the 
individual heterogeneity, leading to a singular matrix. Consequently, because estimating with this method is 
impossible to be put into practice, we have decided to exclude this variable from the study. 
14 See table 1 for a summary of the empirical research on determinants of FDI entry mode choice.  
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To this purpose, we will include in the 6 regressions, two variables associated with the 
countries´ cultural factors. 
One  is  related  to  the  cultural  distance  (CD),  the  other  is  related  to  the  country’s 
uncertainty avoidance (UA). Our hypothesis predicts that, the higher the cultural distance and 
the  more  adverse  to  uncertainty  the  country  is,  the  higher  the  number  of  greenfields,  in 
comparison to other FDI modes. This happens due to the risk, especially organizational risk, 
in terms of integration of the parent company in a foreign management. 
The measures of both variables are the result of a work by Hofstede (1980), who 
considered that the differences in national cultures changed substantially within 4 dimensions: 
1) masculinity; 2) power distance; 3) uncertainty avoidance and 4) individualism.  
Concerning the variable Cultural Distance (CD) we will have to use a composite index 
of the 4 cultural dimensions, for each country in our sample. 
As for the cultural dimension - uncertainty avoidance (UA), which refers to the society 
tolerance  towards  uncertainty  and  ambiguity,  namely,  the  tolerance  to  accept  new 
management  practices,  we  will  use  the  index  that  Hosftede  proposed  to  this  cultural 
dimension.  
Table  4  presents  in  detail  all  the  variables  included  in  the  estimations  and  their 
sources.  
(Insert table 4) 
  In  table  5  we  present  the  means,  the  standard  deviations,  and  the  correlation 
coefficients  of  independent  variables.  The  highest  correlation  is  observed  between  the 
governance  index  (GI)  and  the  human  development  index  (HDI),  the  stock  market 
capitalization (CAP) and the investor protection index. These high correlations indicate the 
generality and scope of the GI index. On the other hand, as expected, we observed a high 
correlation between the two variables associated to the cultural distance, which has led us to 
show  the  estimating  results  where  the  variables  CD  and  UA  were  regressed,  separately. 
Finally, we have concluded that CAP, attained by the ratio of stock market capitalization to 
GDP, was somehow related to all the others. In fact, as this variable is associated to capital 
market liquidity and has GDP as a denominator (which as also part of the description of 
OPENNESS  and  HDI,  for  example)  this  association  was  to  be  expected.  Therefore,  we 
present, in the next section, the estimating results where the variable CAP was, sometimes, 
excluded. 
(Insert table 5) 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 According to the panel data methodology previously described, we present, in tables 6 
to 11 the estimating results of the FDI series. We also present the attained results either by 
using the FEM or the REM, corrected from heteroscedasticity using White’s method (1980). 
We will use the Hausman Test (1980) to decide for the most appropriate estimator in each 
sample.
15.  
Several alternative specifications were tested in an attempt to assess the explanatory 
power of some independents variables. 
 
6.1 Inflows Regressions 
  The basic results for the three inbound investments models are expressed in tables 6 to 
8. 
(Insert tables 6 to 8) 
  One of the main concerns in analysing these three tables is to verify if the potential 
specific M&A and greenfield variables are statistically significant in their own equations and 
not  in  aggregate  FDI  equations  (FDI  variable),  i.e.,  we  are  interested  in  identifying  the 
specific variables of the two entry modes. 
  As far as the mode-encompassing variables (GDP, GDPGROWTH, OPENNESS, GI) 
we can see that the majority is positively significant in almost all the estimating equations, as 
expected. 
  However, there are two differences related to these variables when we consider the 
three tables.  
First, the variable GDPGROWTH seems to influence in a positive way the aggregate 
FDI inputs, not via M&A, once the variable is not significant in the M&A inflows equations 
(table 7). This result seems to be in accordance with the results attained by Globerman and 
Shapiro  (2005),  which  suggest  that  the  growth  of  economy  represents  the  potential  for 
economic rents to be created by the growth process. However, the appropriation of such rents 
may be associated to the establishment of new firms. Identical results were obtained by Zejan 
(1990)  and  Brouthers  and  Brouthers  (2000)  who  stated  that  the  growth  of  host  markets 
                                                
15 Therefore, in table 6, for example, when we compare the equation (1) estimated by FEM  with equation (9), 
estimated by REM, we verify that the observed value by the Hausman test is 13,532, being the critical value of 
the qui-quadratic distribution for 2 degrees of freedom at significance level of 1%, of 11,345. Under these 
circumstances, because the observed value is higher than the critical value, the hypothesis that REM might be 
appropriate is rejected.  
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encouraged greenfields instead of M&A. So, we have concluded that, although this variable is 
not significant in the M&A equations, it is important to explain FDI and also greenfields. 
A  second  difference  concerns  the  results  obtained  in  the  equations  associated  to 
greenfields (IN-GREEN), in which the variables related to GDP and OPENNESS are not 
significant when regressed together with cultural distance variables.  
As  for  the  mode-specific  variables,  we  observed  that  the  variable  associated  with 
markets’  capitalization  (CAP)  is  significant  in  all  the  equations.  So,  we  did  not  get  any 
evidence to prove our hypothesis about capitalization, as an indicator of the deepness of the 
stock markets, to be M&A mode specific. On the contrary, empirical evidence suggests that 
this variable affects all entry modes in a positive and undistinguished way. 
Nevertheless, the investor protection variable (INVPROT) seems to influence only 
M&A. In fact, when we look at the three tables, we see that this variable is not significant in 
any of the equations associated either to FDI or greenfields. Its importance is only enhanced 
in M&A regressions when CAP, CD and UA variables are excluded. These are the variables 
with  which  INVPROT  presents  an  important  correlation
16,17.This  result  suggests  that  the 
higher the investors protection is, the more likely are companies to prefer M&A as an entry 
mode.  
As for the two variables related to cultural distance (CD e UA) we have also found 
some evidence that they are relevant in explaining greenfields. We can see, on table 8, that 
these two variables are significant in explaining greenfields (and not in explaining aggregate 
FDI or M&A), but only when estimated, separately. One should not be surprised by this, since 
the UA variable is one of the cultural dimensions included in the cultural distance index, 
showing,  between  the  two,  a  significant  correlation.  Therefore,  the  empirical  evidence 
suggests  that,  separately,  the  two  cultural  distance  variables  enhanced  greenfields,  in 
detriment of M&A, according with Kogut and Singh (1988).  
In short, we have observed there is a strong correspondence between the three series of 
investments  and  the  mode-encompassing  variables.  In  fact,  the  size  of  the  economy,  its 
openness and governance degree have a positive effect in all the entry modes positive, in an 
undistinguished  way.  One  of  the  differences  we  can  identify  regards  the  influence  of 
economic growth, which seems to affect, primarily, greenfields. As for the corroboration of 
M&A’s  potential  specific  variables,  we  did  not  find  evidence,  just  like  Globerman  and 
                                                
16 See table 5 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables. 
17 This high correlation suggests that the investor protection impact on CAP can be, partially, due to its role in 
the growth of markets liquidity.  
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Shapiro  (2005),  that  the  capitalization  of  the  stock  market  is  specific  to  M&A  inflows. 
However, we observed that the INVPROT is only significant in M&A equations, making it a 
specific factor of that entry mode. Additionally, we have found sufficient statistical evidence 
which allows us to conclude that variables associated cultural distance and aversion to risk, 
when regressed separately, increase the probability of the investments being made via the 
establishment of new branches. 
 
6.2 Outflows Regressions   
  The basic results for the three outbound investments models are expressed in tables 9 
to 11. 
 (Insert tables 9 to 11) 
  There is a considerable symmetry between the regressions related to the inbound and 
outbound investments, in what concerns to the variables associated with markets’ size (GDP) 
and the governance index. The results allow us to conclude that larger economies show more 
FDI  inflows  and  outflows,  no  matter  the  investment  form.  Likewise,  “well  governed” 
countries encourage not only multinationals to establish firms abroad, but they also facilitate 
the growth of domestic multinationals, which, on their turn, establish their own branches 
abroad, too. 
  Additionally, the human development index (HDI) reports a positive and significant 
effect in all the outflows equations. As expected, we have concluded that companies located 
in countries with good physical and human infrastructures show a greater ability in creating 
firm-specific advantages necessary for international production. 
  Still  referring  to  the  mode-encompassing  variables,  we  enhance  two  important 
differences related to the regressions presented in tables 6 to 8.  
  The  first  is  related  to  the  variable  GDPGROWTH  which  presents  a  positive  and 
significant  effect  in  the  FDO  and  OUT-M&A  equations,  but  not  in  the  OUT-GREEN 
equations. This positive relationship, as opposed to Globerman and Shapiro (2005), comes to 
reinforce our hypothesis that a country with a high economic growth (lagged one year) ends 
up  stimulating  domestic  firms  to  invest  abroad,  in  order  to  compensate  the  saturation  of 
domestic markets. On the other hand, we have realized that companies in countries with high 
growing levels prefer M&A as an entry mode. If a high GDP’s growth attracts, primarily, 
investments  via  greenfields,  on  the  other  hand,  it  also  pushes  companies  into  foreign 
expansion  through  M&A,  maybe  because  this  is  the  quickest  way  to  materialize  their 
internationalization advantages. In fact, according to the publication World Investment Report  
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(2006) from UNCTAD, this seems to be very clear in large developing economies, such as 
China and India. 
  A  second  difference  concerns  the  variable  OPENNESS  which,  as  opposed  to  the 
inflows equations, is only significant in the FDO equations, although it shows, as expected, a 
positive sign. In this case, evidence suggests that, the more open to the exterior the country is, 
the more it will invest abroad. The same result was attained by Kyrkilis and Pantelis (2003). 
However, we did not find evidence that the degree of openness affects directly the purchase of 
companies or the establishment of new affiliates abroad. 
  As for the M&A specific variables  we have found evidence that allows us to conclude 
that the deepness and the size of capital markets, measured by the variable CAP, have a 
positive and significant effect in the FDO and M&A equations (tables 9 e 10). Consequently, 
at  least  in  what  outflows  concerns,  capitalization  seems  to  stimulate companies  to invest 
abroad,  especially  through  M&A.  However,  there  is  no  evidence  that  CAP  is  an  M&A 
specific variable, since it is significant in the overall FDO equations.  
  In what concerns the second M&A specific variable – INVPROT – we have seen it is 
significant  and  has  a  positive  sign,  according  to  what  was  expected,  only  in  the  M&A 
equations and when regressed together with GDP and GDPGROWTH (equation 3 in table 
10). Additionally, we have observed that, in greenfields equations (6), (7) and (8) from table 
11, CAP is also significant, but it shows a negative sign. So, both results corroborate our 
hypothesis that the higher is the investor protection, the higher is the likelihood of companies 
to invest abroad through M&A, in detriment of greenfield investments. Therefore, there is 
some evidence that CAP is an M&A specific variable. 
  In a symmetrical way to the results attained in the inflows models, the two cultural 
distance variables (when regressed, separately) are only significant in greenfields equations. 
This result proves our hypothesis that when the countries’ cultural distance and aversion to 
risk are high, companies tend to invest less, but when they invest, they choose to do it via 
greenfields.  This latter result suggests, with some limitations, that cultural variables may be 
greenfields specific. 
  In short, we can state that there is a considerable symmetry with the inflows equations. 
However,  different  results  are  also  observed.  The  economic  growth’s  variable  exerts  a 
positive  impact  on  aggregate  FDO,  especially  via  M&A,  as  opposite  to  Globerman  and 
Shapiro (2005).  
  Additionally,  we  have  found  evidence,  although  with  some  restrictions,  that  the 
investor protection index and the variables associated to the cultural distance (when regressed  
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separately) can be considered as M&A and greenfields specific determinants, respectively.
   
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this study consists in identifying the specific factors of each entry mode, 
namely  M&A  and  greenfield  investments.  In  order  to  do  that,  we  have  compared  the 
determinants  of  M&A  and  greenfields  inflows  and  outflows,  with  the  determinants  of 
aggregate foreign direct investment. In doing so, we consider whether there mode-specific 
determinants.  
Through the introduction of greenfields in(out)bound equations, we have extended the 
analysis by Globerman and Shapiro (2005) who have only investigated the determinants of 
cross  border  M&A  inflows  and  outflows.  Simultaneously,  we  have  adopted  a  panel  data 
analysis, where we combined a cross-section sample of 53 countries over a period of 11 years, 
between 1996 and 2006. 
In general, we can conclude that there is a group of variables which are important in 
explaining any form of investment, both inbound and outbound. The size of the economy, the 
degree of openness and the governance level are, in most cases, positively correlated with all 
series of inward and outward investment. Additionally, the coefficient values are very similar 
in each group of equations. Only for the case of outbound equations, we had also observed a 
positive sign between human development index and all forms of outbound investments. 
There are, however, some differences between the structure of M&A, greenfields and 
aggregate FDI. In particular, and according to Globerman and Shapiro (2005), we have seen 
that economic growth is an important determinant in attracting FDI, but only for greenfields. 
On  the  other  hand,  this  growth  tends  to  push  a  rise  in  outward  investments,  i.e.,  the 
investments made  by  national  companies  abroad,  especially  via  M&A.  In  other  words,  a 
country that shows a fast economic growth tends to be host, primarily, of foreign investment 
via the establishment of new firms; simultaneously, this country encourages its companies to 
invest abroad, through M&A. 
As  for  the  existence  of  mode-specific  determinants,  we  can  conclude,  with  some 
reservations, that the investor protection index is important to understand both M&A inflows 
and outflows. This result suggests that the investor protection may, under certain conditions 
(when we exclude in M&A regressions, variables such as capitalization and cultural distance), 
stimulate M&A and be pointed as specific factor of this FDI entry mode, which contradicts 
the evidence attained by Globerman and Shapiro (2005).  
  21 
With respect to stock market capitalization variable, we did not find any evidence that 
this variable is specific to cross border M&A.  
Additionally, we have seen that the two variables associated to cultural distance, when 
regressed  separately,  influence  in  a  positive  way  the  likelihood  of  companies  to  choose 
greenfields.  Consequently,  the  evidence  suggests,  with  some  assurance,  that  these  two 
variables play an important role in deciding for greenfields as a FDI entry mode. 
To sum up, we may conclude that the introduction of the panel data, when compared 
to the work of Globerman and Shapiro (2005), allowed us to gather more conclusive evidence 
about the mode- specific determinants. 
However,  there  was  an  important  aspect  that  we  could  not  analyse  in  this  study 
because the number of observations was different in each regression and because greenfields’ 
series were expressed in different units of measure. It was the magnitude of the effects and its 
comparison between each investment’s series. This might be an interesting and important 
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Tables 
Table 1 – Summary of Empirical Research on Determinants of FDI Entry Mode Choice  
Relation between determinants and  the propensity to acquire  Determinants 
Positive  Negative  Insignificant 
Firm-level Factors 




Wilson (1980)  Caves  and  Mehra 
(1986) 
Kogut and Singh (1988) 
Hennart  and  Park 
(1993) 
Multinational Experience  Caves and Mehra (1986) 
Brouthers  and  Brouthers 
(2000) 
Barkema and Vermeulen 
(1998) 
Andersson and Svensson 
(1994) 
  Kogut and Singh (1988) 
 
Product Diversification  Wilson (1980)  Hennart  and  Reddy 
(1997) 
Kogut  and  Singh 
(1988) 
Brouthers  and 
Brouthers (2000) 
Zejan (1990) 
Caves  and  Mehra 
(1986) 
Hennart  and  Park 
(1993) 
Harzing (2002) 
Kogut and Singh (1988) 
Relative Size of Investment  Caves and Mehra (1986) 
Andersson and Svensson 
(1994) 
Barkema and Vermeulen 
(1998) 
Brouthers  and  Brouthers 
(2000) 
Hennart and Park (1993) 
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Table 1 – Summary of Empirical Research on Determinants of FDI Entry Mode Choice  
(continued) 
Industry-level Factors 
R&D Intensity    Kogut and Singh (1988) 
Hennart and Park (1993) 
Brouthers  and  Brouthers 
(2000) 
Andersson and Svensson 
(1994) 
Anand and Delios (2002) 
Caves  and  Mehra 
(1986) 
Advertising Intensity  Anand and Delios (2002)    Caves  and  Mehra 
(1986) 
Kogut and Singh (198 
Hennart  and  Park 
(1993) 
Concentration Ratio       Hennart  and  Reddy 
(1997) 
Anand  and  Delios 
(2002) 
Industry Growth  Caves and Mehra (1986) 
Hennart and Reddy (1997) 
  Hennart  and  Park 
(1993) 
Anand  and  Delios 
(2002) 
Country-level factors 
Cultural Distance    Kogut and Singh (1988) 
Harzing (2002) 
Barkema and Vermeulen 
(1998) 
Brouthers  and 
Brouthers (2000) 
Hennart  and  Reddy 
(1997) 
Market Size in host Country      Barkema  and 
Vermeulen (1998) 
Zejan (1990) 
Market  Growth  in  host 
Country 
  Zejan (1990) 
Brouthers  and  Brouthers 
(2000) 
Andersson  and 
Svensson (1994) 
Barkema  and 
Vermeulen (1998) 
Market Development in host 
Country 
Andersson  and  Svensson 
(1994) 
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Table 2 – List of Countries included in the sample 1996-2006 
 
Groups   Countries 
Developed Countries 
 
Germany; Australia; Austria;  Belgium;  Canada;  Denmark;  Norway; 
Slovakia;  Slovenia;  Spain;  United  States;  Estonia;  Finland;  France; 
Greece;  Netherlands;  Hungary;  Ireland;  Israel;  Portugal;  United 
Kingdom;  Czech  Republic;  Sweden;  Switzerland;  Italy;  Israel; 
Luxembourg; Japan; New Zealand. 
Developing Countries  South Africa; Argentina; Brazil; Bulgaria; Chile; China; Colombia; 
Croatia; Philippines; Hong Kong; India; Indonesia; Malaysia; México; 
Peru; Republic of  Korea; Romania; Russia; Singapore; Egypt; 
Turkey; Taiwan; Thailand; Venezuela 
Note: United Nations criteria 
 
 
Table 3 – Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix of Dependent Variables 
 
  Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
FDI  8,563 
(1,479) 
1,00           
FDO  7,719 
(2,507) 
0,621  1,00         
IN-M&A  7,647 
(1,931) 
0,723  0,615  1,00       
OUT-M&A  6,909 
(2,891) 
0,631  0,699  0,707  1,00     
IN-GREEN  4,479 
(1,044) 
0,599  0,367  0,447  0,356  1,00   
OUT-GREEN  3,956 
(1,599) 
0,523  0,790  0,584  0,637  0,490  1,00 
Notes:  
FDI  –  Natural  logarithmic  of  FDI  inflows  (current  prices,  millions  of  U.S.  Dollars),  in 
country i in year t. 
FDO – Natural logarithmic of FDI outflows (current prices, millions of U.S. Dollars), in 
country i in year t. 
IN-M&A  -  Natural  logarithmic  of  inward  M&A  FDI  (current  prices,  millions  of  U.S. 
Dollars), in country i in year t. 
OUT-M&A - Natural logarithmic of outward M&A (current prices millions of U.S. Dollars), 
in country i in year t. 
IN-GREEN - Natural logarithmic of the number of projects of greenfields realized by foreign 
firms in country i in year t. 
OUT-GREEN - Natural logarithmic of the number of projects of greenfields realized by the 
domestic firms of country i in year t. 
Source:  -  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade and  Development  (UNCTAD),  FDI/TNC 





Table 4 – Variables Definition 
Variable  Definition  Source 
Dependent Variables 
FDI  Natural logarithmic of FDI inflows (current prices, millions of 
U.S. Dollars), in country i in year t.  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FDI/TNC 
Statistics Database On-line, [http://stats.unctad.org/FDI]. 
FDO  Natural logarithmic of FDI outflows (current prices, millions 
of U.S. Dollars), in country i in year t.  
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FDI/TNC 
Statistics Database On-line, [http://stats.unctad.org/FDI]. 
IN-M&A  Natural logarithmic of inward M&A (current prices, millions 
of U.S. Dollars), in country i in year t. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FDI/TNC 
Statistics Database On-line, [http://stats.unctad.org/FDI]. 
OUT-M&A  Natural logarithmic of outward M&A (current prices millions 
of U.S. Dollars), in country i in year t. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FDI/TNC 
Statistics Database On-line, [http://stats.unctad.org/FDI].  
IN-GREEN  Natural logarithmic of the number of projects of greenfields 
realized by foreign firms in country i in year t. 
United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD),  World 
Investment Report, various years. 
OUT-GREEN  Natural logarithmic of the number of projects of greenfields 
realized by the domestic firms of country i in year t. 
United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  (UNCTAD),  World 
Investment Report, various years. 
Independent Variables 
GDPGROWTH  Annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in country i in 
yea t-1. Gross Domestic Product at constant market prices. 
International  Monetary  Fund  (2007),  World  Economic  Outlook  Database, 
[http://www.ifm.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/weodata]. 
GDP  Natural  logarithmic  of  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  at  current 
prices (millions of U.S. Dollars), in country i in year t. 
International Monetary Fund (2007), World Economic Outlook Database 2007, 
[http://www.ifm.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/weodata]. 
GI  Governance Index in country i in year t. This index was estimated by 
Kaufmann Kraay e Mastruzzi (KKM), and has been used as a proxy 
of  country’s  political,  institutional  and  legal  environment.  It  was 
obtained by the arithmetic mean of 6 sub-indices, such as: 1) Political 
Instability  and  Violence;  2)  Government  Effectiveness;  3)  Quality 
Burden;  4)  Rule  of  Law;  5)  Corruption  Control  e  6)  Voice  and 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007), “Governance Matters VI: Governance 





Political  Freedom.  The  index  is  defined  in  a  scale  of  0  (“bad” 
governed) to 100 (“well” governed).  
Is not available information for the years 1997, 1999 and 2001 But, 
since the country’s values are too similar across the analysis period, 
we  assumed  for  the  missing  years,  the  values  observed  in  the 
preceding year. 
OPENNESS  Openness of country i in year t. This index is given by the sum of 
exports and imports as a share of GDP. 






Human  Development  Index  of  country  i  in  year  t.  This  index  is 
composed  by  three  sub-indices:  1)  GDP  per  capita,  2)  Education, 
measured by a combination of adult literacy and the combined gross 
primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment and 3) Life Expectancy at 
Birth.  
Is not available information for Taiwan; since it is not considered has 
a UN member.  





Ratio of Stock Market Capitalization to GDP in country i in year t. 
Is not available information for the year 1997 and for Taiwan? 
 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (1998-2002), New York. 








Investor Protection Index in country i in year t. It was developed by 
LaPorta et al. (1998) and later extended to transition economies by 
Pistor  et  al.  (2000),  as  an  interaction  of  an  index  of  shareholder 
(antidirector) rights, and an index of the rule law. 






  For recent years, the World’s Bank publication - Doing Business has 
also  available  information  for  this  index.  The  values  are 
comprehended between 0 (minimum protection) and 10 (maximum 
protection).  
However,  this  publication  only  available  information  since  2004 
(inclusive). But, since the indices developed by La Porta et al. (1998) 
and World Bank are not directly comparables, we must have to adopt 
only  one.  Consequently,  we  adopt  the  index  available  by  World 
Bank,  since  it  gives  us  more  recent  information.  For  the  missing 
years we assumed the information we have for the last year available 






Cultural Distance in country i in year t. Is an index composed by four 
cultural dimensions, developed by Hofstede, such as: 1) masculinity; 
2)  power  distance;  3)  uncertainty  avoidance  and  4)  individualism. 
Recently,  Hofstede  construct  one  additional  dimension  for  some 
countries – Long- Term Orientation.  
The CD index was constructed as the arithmetic mean of the four (or 
five) cultural dimensions indices’ for each country. 
For Croatia and Slovenia is not available information. For the Egypt 
case we assume the values that Hofstede has calculated for Arabic 
World. 
Hofstede (1980), Culture´s Consequences: International Differences in Work-
Related Values, Beverly Hills CA: Sage Publications. 




Uncertainty Avoidance in country i in year t. This variable is one of 
the cultural dimensions purposed by Hofstede (1980) and is one of 
the components of CD index.  
For Croatia and Slovenia is not available information. For the Egypt 
case we assume the values that Hofstede has calculated for Arabic 
Hofstede (1980), Culture´s Consequences: International Differences in Work-
Related Values, Beverly Hills CA: Sage Publications. 

















(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
GDP  12,231 
(1,419) 
1,00                 
GDPGROWTH  3,675 
(3,263) 
-0,073  1,00               
GI  71,085 
(21,932) 
0,173  -0,089  1,00             
HDI  0,853 
(0,089) 
0,270  -0,147  0,826  1,00           
OPENNESS  0,719 
(0,554) 
-0,342  0,127  0,197  0,159  1,00         
CAP  70,682 
(72,022) 
0,168  0,041  0,380  0,286  0,400  1,00       
INVPROT  5,734 
(1,685) 
-0,071  0,066  0,328  0,178  0,399  0,363  1,00     
CD  54,089 
(9,147) 
0,177  -0,005  -0,323  -0,174  -0,143  -0,183  -0,335  1,00   
UA  63,809 
(23,183) 




The tables 6 at 11 reports the regression of the variables associated with the inbound and outbound investment series when and the group of independent variables. These 
tables’ presents the results estimated using fixed Effects Model (FEM) and Random Effects Model (REM). The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors corrected for 
heterocedasticity using White (1980) method. Also reports the F test and adjusted R
2, tests for assessing the adjustment quality, and the Hausman (1978) test, a test with H0: 
random effects are consistent and efficient, versus H1: random effects are inconsistent, in order to choose the most appropriate model for each particular regression. 
Table 6: Regression of FDI Dependent Variable 
  FEM  REM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
C  -5,880*  -5,510*  -3,691***  -4,915*  -4,653**  -7,042***  -9,776  -9,919  -1,835**  -2,648*  -1,659***  -2,473*  -1,649***  -1,385  -1,337  -1,371 
  (-6,027)  (1,591)  (1,916)  (1,910)  (1,992)  (4,143)  (6,395)  (6,432)  (0,847)  (0,829)  (0,927)  (0,872)  (0,873)  (1,077)  (1,030)  (1,103) 
GDP  0,905*  0,856*  1,049*  0,867*  0,713*  0,634*  0,626*  0,599*  0,727*  0,779*  0,778*  0,781*  0,724*  0,705*  0,703*  0,702* 
  (0,130)  (0,131)  (0,132)  (0,133)  (0,138)  (0,220)  (0,197)  (0,229)  (0,068)  (0,066)  (0,069)  (0,066)  (0,066)  (0,071)  (0,068)  (0,074) 
GDPGROWTH  0,019***  0,020***  0,024**  0,025**  0,020***  0,018  0,019***  0,018  0,030*  0,021***  0,030*  0,021***  0,017  0,020***  0,020***  0,020*** 
  (0,012)  (0,012)  (0,012)  (0,012)  (0,011)  (0,012)  (0,012)  (0,012)  (0,011)  (0,011)  (0,011)  (0,011)  (0,011)  (0,011)  (0,011)  (0,011) 
GI  0,040*  0,042*    0,042*  0,044*  0,046*  0,044*  0,045*  0,019*  0,015*    0,016*  0,015*  0,015*  0,015*  0,015* 
  (0,009)  (0,009)    (0,042)  (0,009)  (0,010)  (0,010)  (0,011)  (0,004)  (0,004)    (0,005)  (0,004)  (0,005)  (0,004)  (0,005 
OPENNESS    0,826*    0,829*  0,662**  0,497***  0,504***  0,502***    0,706*    0,743*  0,591*  0,568*  0,561*  0,557* 
    (0,260)    (0,260)  (0,295)  (0,301)  (0,299)  (0,302)    (0,158)    (0,166)  (0,178)  (0,180)  (0,184)  (0,193) 
INVPROT      -0,113  -0,131  0,113  0,102  0,073  0,078      0,103  -0,050  -0,067  -0,060  -0,061  -0,061 
      (0,238)  (0,232)  (0,264)  (0,266)  (0,269)  (0,270)      (0,066)  (0,065)  (0,063)  (0,067)  (0,066)  (0,067) 
CAP          0,004*  0,004*  0,004*  0,004*          0,003*  0,003*  0,003*  0,003* 
          (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)          (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001) 
CD            0,062    0,027            -0,001    0,001 
            (0,103)    (0,119)            (0,012)    (0,015) 
UA              0,101  0,085              -0,001  -0,001 
              (0,125)  (0,145)              (0,004)  (0,006) 
Adjusted R
2  0,746  0,750  0,736  0,750  0,765  0,744  0,744  0,743  0,219  0,252  0,196  0,250  0,277  0,265  0,265  0,262 
F Statistic                  13,532*  12,921**  6,050  12,602**  17,066*  17,062**  17,270**  17,312** 
Hausman Test  31,380*  31,544*  29,950*  30,956*  31,254*  27,335*  27,358*  26,822*  54,360*  48,986*  47,286*  38,971*  34,817*  27,208*  27,170*  23,568* 
N  571  571  571  571  531  509  509  509  571  571  571  571  531  509  509  509 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*     significant at 1% 
**   significant at 5% 








Table 7: Regression of IN-M&A Dependent Variable 
 
  FEM  REM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
C  -8,429*  -8,061*  -6,611*  -7,350*  -5,306***  -5,739  -19,049**  -18,277**  -5,195*  -5,892*  -5,251*  -5,962*  -4,870*  -3,967*  -4,161*  -3,918* 
  (2,359)  (2,336)  (2,799)  (2,821)  (3,028)  (6,016)  (9,306)  (9,353)  (0,862)  (0,915)  (1,002)  (0,936)  (0,927)  (1,062)  (1,013)  (1,064) 
GDP  1,141*  1,017*  1,224*  1,032*  0,799*  0,843*  0,540***  0,688**  0,905*  0,954*  0,978*  0,952*  0,875*  0,869*  0,841*  0.866* 
  (0,194)  (0,192)  (0,192)  (0,195)  (0,207)  (0,324)  (0,286)  (0,335)  (0,069)  (0,073)  (0,075)  (0,072)  (0,071)  (0,072)  (0,068)  (0,074) 
GDPGROWTH  -0,002  -0,011  0,002  -0,011  -0,010  -0,009  -0,002  -0,001  -0,001  -0,006  -0,001  -0,006  -0,009  -0,007  -0,008  -0,007 
  (0,017  (0,017)  (0,017)  (0,017)  (0,017)  (0,016)  (0,017)  (0,017)  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,015)  (0,015)  (0,015) 
GI  0,030**  0,033**    0,033**  0,042*  0,039**  0,039*  0,034**  0,025*  0,022*    0,022*  0,021*  0,020*  0,021*  0,020* 
  (0,014)  (0,013)    (0,013)  (0,014)  (0,015)  (0,014)  (0,015)  (0,005)  (0,004)    (0,005))  (0,005)  (0,004)  (0,004)  (0,004) 
OPENNESS    1,370*    1,375*  1,251*  1,241*  1,008*  1,174**    0,411**    0,384**  0,107  0,120  0,041  0,102 
    (0,383)    (0,383)  (0,446)  (0,505)  (0,466)  (0,505)    (0,182)    (0,191)  (0,199)  (0,190)  (0,190)  (0,201) 
INVPROT      0,128**  0,120***  0,100***  -0,158  -0,249  -0,274      0,162**  0,105  0,013  -0,001  0,011  0,001 
      (0,065)  (0,068)  (0,060)  (0,062)  (0,062)  (0,060)      (0,067)  (0,067)  (0,062)  (0,062)  (0,059)  (0,061) 
CAP          0,002**  0,002**  0,002**  0,002**          0,003*  0,003*  0,003*  0,003* 
          (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)          (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001) 
CD            0,005    -0,148            -0,013    -0,012 
            (0,151)    (0,174)            (0,011)    (0,013) 
UA              0,281  0,372              -0,003  -0,001 
              (0,184)  (0,233)              (0,004)  (0,005) 
Adjusted R
2  0,662  0,669  0,691  0,690  0,670  0,666  0,667  0,667  0,281  0,281  0,227  0,283  0,324  0,332  0,343  0,338 
F Statistic  21,657*  21,979*  21,381*  21,564*  20,200*  19,460*  19,599*  19,257*  76,606*  57,789*  57,752*  46,758*  44,105*  37,775*  39,622*  34,149* 
Hausman Test                  5,174  13,410*  9,374**  13,380*  13,613**  14,233**  21,216*  20,907* 
N  581  581  581  581  540  520  520  520  581  581  581  581  540  520  520  520 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*     significant at 1% 
**   significant at 5% 















Table 8: Regression of IN-GREEN Dependent Variable 
 
  FEM  REM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
C  -4,437*  -3,901**  -4,311*  -3,589**  -2,057  -16,053***  -10,065  -18,992***  -2,017*  -2,657*  -2,469*  -2,642*  -2,502*  -3,226***  -2,078**  -2,845* 
  (1,636)  (1,636)  (1,378)  (1,714)  (1,848)  (8,653)  (8,222)  (10,350)  (0,705)  (0,702)  (0,727)  (0,726)  (0,773)  (0,945)  (0,930)  (0,949) 
GDP  0,717*  0,646*  0,728*  0,655*  0,586*  0,129  0,496*  0,124  0,544*  0,584*  0,536*  0,585*  0,578*  0,558***  0,576*  0,522* 
  (0,108)  (0,111)  (0,109)  (0,113)  (0,125)  (0,308)  (0,161)  (0,309)  (0,068)  (0,054)  (0,055)  (0,054)  (0,058)  (0,062)  (0,061)  (0,064) 
GDPGROWTH  0,019***  0,017***  0,019***  0,017***  0,018***  0,013  0,015  0,015  0,032***  0,022**  0,033*  0,022**  0,022**  0,022**  0,022**  0,023** 
  (0,010)  (0,010)  (0,010)  (0,010)  (0,011)  (0,011)  (0,010)  (0,011)  (0,009)  (0,009)  (0,009)  (0,009)  (0,009)  (0,009)  (0,010)  (0,010) 
GI  0,029**  0,030*    0,030*  0,033*  0,030**  0,033**  0,033**  0,016*  0,015*    0,016*  0,018*  0,016*  0,017*  0,017* 
  (0,011)  (0,011)    (0,011)  (0,012)  (0,013)  (0,013)  (0,013)  (0,004)  (0,004)    (0,004)  (0,004)  (0,004)  (0,003)  (0,004) 
OPENNESS    0,525**    0,531**  0,207  0,024  0,151  0,011    0,536*    0,540*  0,532*  0,520*  0,493*  0,384** 
    (0,230)    (0,230)  (0,313)  (0,342)  (0,330)  (0,344)    (0,124)    (0,130)  (0,156)  (0,158)  (0,165)  (0,167) 
INVPROT      -0,056  -0,068  -0,125  -0,144  -0,166  -0,162      0,0290  -0,005  -0,010  0,012  -0,018  0,005 
      (0,107)  (0,107)  (0,129)  (0,131)  (0,136)  (0,136)      (0,048)  (0,050)  (0,050)  (0,053)  (0,054)  (0,053) 
CAP          0,003**  0,002**  0,003**  0,002***          0,001  0,001  0,001  0,001 
          (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)          (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001) 
CD            0,358***    0,322            0,014    0,030** 
            (0,217)    (0,228)            (0,010)    (0,012) 
UA              0,181***  0,077              -0,005  -0,011** 
              (0,110)  (0,148)              (0,004)  (0,005) 
Adjusted R
2  0,903  0,904  0,903  0,904  0,904  0,900  0,899  0,900*  0,302  0,347  0,297  0,344  0,351  0,342  0,338  0,357 
F Statistic  45,436*  45,619*  45,497*  44,696*  39,700*  37,173*  36,763*  36,368*  39,121*  36,133*  38,179*  28,692*  22,100*  17,667*  17,348*  16,531* 
Hausman Test                  20,342*  12,734**  21,178*  13,161**  28,301*  31,626*  27,491*  29,311* 
N  265  265  265  265  265  225  225  225  265  265  265  265  265  225  225  225 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*     significant at 1% 
**   significant at 5% 



















Table 9: Regression of FDO Dependent Variable 
 
  FEM  REM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
C  -21,422*  -21,128*  -16,429*  -21,037*  -20,762*  -15,806*  -15,019***  -13,184  -17,284*  -17,217*  -12,674*  -17,350*  -16,210*  -14,801*  -15,315*  -14,830* 
  (2,389)  (2,491)  (2,558)  (2,845)  (3,038)  (0,067)  (8,851)  (9,137)  (1,386)  (1,349)  (1,515)  (1,418)  (1,388)  (1,574)  (1,481)  (1,587) 
GDP  1,254*  1,272*  1,955*  1,274*  1,308*  1,486*  1,407*  1,524*  1,105*  1,182*  1,525*  1,181*  1,138*  1,159*  1,096*  1,133* 
  (0,228)  (0,232)  (0,179)  (0,235)  (0,245)  (0,314)  (0,297)  (0,330)  (0,095)  (0,096)  (0,113)  (0,097)  (0,091)  (0,099)  (0,097)  (0,106) 
GDPGROWTH  0,039**  0,038**  0,045*  0,038**  0,029***  0,028***  0,026  0,025  0,047*  0,039**  0,050*  0,039**  0,029***  0,029***  0,029***  0,029*** 
  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,017)  (0,017)  (0,017)  (0,017)  (0,017)  (0,017)  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,016) 
GI  0,022***  0,021    0,021  0,018  0,019  0,025***  0,020  0,016**  0,018**    0,017**  0,015***  0,013***  0,013***  0,014*** 
  (0,013)  (0,013)    (0,013)  (0,014)  (0,015)  (0,014)  (0,016)  (0,008)  (0,007)    (0,008)  (0,008)  (0,008)  (0,008)  (0,008) 
HDI  14,088*  13,380*    13,379*  11,673*  14,521*  12,932*  14,609*  11,729*  9,950*    10,035*  9,453*  9,381*  10,151*  9,880* 
  (3,096)  (3,526)    (3,530)  (3,607)  (4,380)  (3,875)  (4,390)  (1,845)  (1,900)    (1,924)  (1,842)  (1,864)  (1,964)  (1,992) 
OPENNESS    0,168    0,169  0,230  0,128  0,025  0,143    0,624*    0,602**  0,505**  0,469**  0,440***  0,468*** 
    (0,400)    (0,401)  (0,466)  (0,497)  (0,477)  (0,499)    (0,222)    (0,235)  (0,241)  (0,244)  (0,258)  (0,265) 
INVPROT      -0,007  -0,021  0,125  0,149  0,185  0,171      0,249*  0,024  0,005  -0,022  -0,011  -0,024 
      (0,313)  (0,307)  (0,361)  (0,356)  (0,361)  (0,361)      (0,114)  0,087)  (0,080)  (0,085)  (0,084)  (0,086) 
CAP          0,002  0,002***  0,002***  0,002***          0,004*  0,004*  0,004*  0,004* 
          (0,002)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)          (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001) 
CD            -0,180    -0,152            -0,025    -0,017 
            (0,173)    (0,187)            (0,016)    (0,019) 
UA              -0,138  -0,076              -0,009  -0,006 
              (0,184)  (0,199)              (0,006)  (0,008) 
Adjusted R
2  0,846  0,845  0,839  0,845  0,849  0,849  0,849  0,849  0,408  0,426  0,272  0,423  0,469  0,460  0,458  0,457 
F Statistic  54,031*  52,996*  52,335*  51,976*  49,637*  48,470*  48,402*  47,541*  94,249*  81,539*  68,451*  67,258*  64,139*  52,163*  51,721*  45,867* 
Hausman Test                  6,261  5,256  13,665*  5,134  10,296  11,612  10,506  11,201 
N  543  543  543  543  502  481  481  481  543  543  543  543  502  481  481  481 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*     significant at 1% 
**   significant at 5% 












Table 10: Regression of OUT-M&A Dependent Variable 
 
 
  FEM  REM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
C  -17,051*  -16,795*  -10,402**  -16,389*  -15,313*  -5,873  -11,767  -8,158  -15,512*  -15,804*  -12,696*  -16,507  -14,808*  -13,631*  -13,906*  -13,674* 
  (3,680)  (3,774)  (4,038)  (4,389)  (4,885)  (9,569)  (14,375)  (14,639)  (1,755)  (1,734)  (1,692)  (1,792)  (1,710)  (1,861)  (1,743)  (1,843) 
GDP  0,477  0,500  1,393*  0,507  0,435  0,843***  0,536  0,815  1,172*  1,252*  1,387*  1,238  1,166*  1,164*  1,089*  1,110* 
  (0,359)  (0,366)  (0,275)  (0,369)  (0,397)  (0,507)  (0,478)  (0,525)  (0,108)  (0,112)  (0,127)  (0,111)  (0,101)  (0,109)  (0,106)  (0,117) 
CRESGDP  0,114*  0,113*  0,124*  0,113*  0,112*  0,106*  0,106*  0,107*  0,109*  0,102*  0,112*  0,102  0,0924*  0,093*  0,081*  0,091* 
  (0,025)  (0,025)  (0,025)  (0,025)  (0,026)  (0,026)  (0,027)  (0,027)  (0,023)  (0,023)  (0,024)  (0,023)  (0,024)  (0,024)  (0,024)  (0,024) 
GI  0,035***  0,035***    0,035***  0,038***  0,036  0,045**  0,035  0,038*  0,038*    0,034  0,032*  0,028*  0,026*  0,026*** 
  (0,019)  (0,020)    (0,020)  (0,021)  (0,024)  (0,023)  (0,024)  (0,010)  (0,010)    (0,010)  (0,010)  (0,010)  (0,010)  (0,010) 
HDI  17,664*  16,881*    16,892*  15,241*  21,600*  17,098*  21,523*  5,702**  4,402***    4,921  4,238***  4,894**  6,137**  5,978 
  (4,899)  (5,508)    (5,514)  (5,830)  (7,240)  (6,384)  (7,257)  (2,438)  (2,465)    (2,482)  (2,309)  (2,338)  (2,448)  (2,501) 
OPENNESS    0,194    0,196  0,057  0,256  -0,026  0,245    0,541**    0,397  0,0045  0,067  -0,161  -0,011 
    (0,623)    (0,624)  (0,755)  (0,812)  (0,787)  (0,815)    (0,269)    (0,285)  (0,279)  (0,281)  (0,292)  (0,315) 
INVPROT      0,305**  0,295***  0,068  0,058  0,072  0,038      0,363*  0,142  0,098  0,058  0,066  0,058 
      (0,155)  (0,165)  (0,305)  (0,302)  (0,304)  (0,303)      (0,116)  (0,097)  (0,085)  (0,089)  (0,085)  (0,088) 
CAP          0,004**  0,004**  0,004**  0,004**          0,007*  0,007*  0,007*  0,007* 
          (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,002)          (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,002) 
CD            -0,364    -0,391            -0,022    -0,009 
            (0,278)    (0,305)            (0,016)    (0,019) 
UA              -0,106  0,068              -0,012***  -0,010 
              (0,298)  (0,328)              (0,007)  (0,008) 
Adjusted R
2  0,710  0,710  0,703  0,709  0,703  0,686  0,685  0,686  0,327  0,339  0,218  0,344  0,428  0,416  0,427  0,422 
F Statistic  25,436*  24,946*  24,933*  24,470*  22,125*  20,116*  20,016*  19,727*  68,754*  58,236*  52,734*  49,782*  56,210*  45,356*  47,438*  41,366* 
Hausman Test                  12,135**  12,501*  8,039**  12,503***  13,342***  13,374***  12,863  14,149 
N  559  559  559  559  518  499  499  499  559  559  559  559  518  499  499  499 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*     significant at 1% 
**   significant at 5% 















Table 11: Regression of OUT-GREEN Dependent Variable 
 
 
  FEM  REM 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
C  -12,256*  -11,847*  -6,799*  -10,942*  -8,038**  -8,537  -19,513***  -17,434  -10,058*  -10,263  -8,051*  -10,421*  -9,595*  -8,848*  -9,414*  -8,874* 
  (3,148)  (3,335)  (1,956)  (3,370)  (3,851)  (13,349)  (11,695)  (15,716)  (1,055)  (1,055)  (0,988)  (1,100)  (1,221)  (1,307)  (1,251)  (1,317) 
GDP  0,364***  0,367***  0,951*  0,387***  0,323  0,295  0,206  0,280  0,829*  0,872  0,913*  0,869*  0,817*  0,878*  0,827*  0,869* 
  (0,217)  (0,217)  (0,154)  (0,217)  (0,237)  (0,457)  (0,263)  (0,457)  (0,060)  (0,062)  (0,074)  (0,063)  (0,071)  (0,074)  (0,074)  (0,080) 
GDPGROWTH  -0,007  -0,008  -0,008  -0,007  -0,005  -0,004  0,001  0,002  -0,005  -0,011  -0,013  -0,012  -0,014  -0,014  -0,014  -0,014 
  (0,014)  (0,014)  (0,014)  (0,014)  (0,015)  (0,015)  (0,016)  (0,016)  (0,012)  (0,012)  (0,013)  (0,012)  (0,013)  (0,013)  (0,013)  (0,013) 
GI  0,031**  0,031***    0,033**  0,041**  0,044**  0,036***  0,037***  0,019*  0,018    0,017*  0,016**  0,014**  0,014**  0,014* 
  (0,016)  (0,016)    (0,016)  (0,017)  (0,019)  (0,019)  (0,020)  (0,006)  (0,006)    (0,006)  (0,006)  (0,006)  (0,006)  (0,007) 
HDI  16,017*  15,385*    15,791*  14,348**  14,383**  13,269**  14,037**  2,748***  2,150    2,329  2,229  1,860  2,563  2,044 
  (4,837)  (5,127)    (5,791)  (5,629)  (7,014)  (5,840)  (7,018)  (1,532)  (1,544)    (1,576)  (1,669)  (1,640)  (1,755)  (1,781) 
OPENNESS    0,127    0,140  -0,125  -0,104  -0,162  -0,140    0,323    0,302*  0,130  0,161  0,056  0,140 
    (0,336)    (0,335)  (0,465)  (0,493)  (0,480)  (0,494)    (0,136)    (0,145)  (0,183)  (0,180)  (0,191)  (0,201) 
INVPROT      -0,180  -0,236  -0,298  -
0,304*** 
-0,358***  -0,358***      0,122***  0,024  0,013  -0,010  0,003  -0,010 
      (0,151)  (0,147)  (0,184)  (0,185)  (0,193)  (0,193)      (0,064)  (0,053)  (0,057)  (0,059)  (0,058)  (0,059) 
CAP          0,003  0,003  0,002  0,002          0,002**  0,003*  0,003*  0,003* 
          (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,002)          (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001)  (0,001) 
CD            0,345***    0,237            -0,018***    -0,016 
            (0,196)    (0,216)            (0,011)    (0,013) 
UA              0,346***  0,226              -0,005  -0,001 
              (0,205)  (0,211)              (0,005)  (0,006) 
Adjusted R
2  0,922  0,923  0,919  0,923  0,916  0,914  0,914  0,667  0,526  0,537  0,365  0,530  0,534  0,554  0,544  0,549 
F Statistic  56,792*  55,566*  54,581*  55,069*  44,155*  42,130*  42,436*  19,257*  73,531*  61,461*  50,979*  50,107*  38,754*  35,304*  33,936*  30,936* 
Hausman Test                  26,513*  22,540*  7,582***  24,872*  22,693*  23,298*  23,774*  25,105* 
N  262  262  262  262  232  222  222  520  262  262  262  262  232  222  222  222 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*     significant at 1% 
**   significant at 5% 
*** significant at 10% 
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, ￿ - ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿# ￿% ! ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿" . ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿$￿ 0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿! ￿￿& ￿￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿￿ ￿￿￿( ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿
￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿   ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿) ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿$￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿" 2 ￿
( ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* % 3 % ￿( ￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿" ￿￿￿￿! ￿+￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿- ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ . ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿, ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿! / ￿￿￿$￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿" 5 ￿
( ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿$% ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % 7 % ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ * ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿" 8 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿* ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿* 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿" ￿￿
/ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ( ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿0 ! ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿   ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿* 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿" ;￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* % 3 % ￿( ￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 3 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ! ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿0 ￿0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
* 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿" ￿￿
( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ # ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿* ￿ ￿￿4￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿  ￿￿￿ ￿￿3 ￿￿￿6 ￿ ￿￿ ￿* ￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿7 8 9 7 ￿￿￿ ￿7 8 9 : ￿￿￿* 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿. # ￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ <￿ ￿ <& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿= ￿￿ ￿ > ￿<? ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ) ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿. ￿￿
3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿? ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ $ ￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿$￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿. " ￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ; ￿ & ￿ ￿￿￿ < ￿ ￿, ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿. . ￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ +￿ 0 ￿￿￿￿+￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿+￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ $ ￿
# ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿￿3 ￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿. 2 ￿
B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ A ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 4￿ ! ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿+￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ / ￿* ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿0 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿. 5 ￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿$% ￿& % ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿ ￿> ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ # ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿. 8 ￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ <? ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿3 ￿ ￿0 ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿- ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿( > ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿. ￿￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ <? ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=% ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿? @ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿A ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿. ;￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ <? ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=# ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿B ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿? @ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ $ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿? @ ￿ ￿￿￿￿C ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿? @ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿. ￿￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ <￿ ￿ <& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=# ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿0 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿0 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿2 # ￿
/ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿$￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ <? ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ <? ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿3 ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿$￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿2 " ￿
& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿3 % ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿3 ￿ ￿ 0 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* % 3 % ￿( ￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=# ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿. ￿# ￿0 ￿0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿> ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿2 . ￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* % 3 % ￿( ￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=( ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿D￿￿￿ ! ￿￿￿ ￿￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿2 2 ￿
* ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿* ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* % 3 % ￿( ￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿+￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿! ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ E ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿/ # ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿2 5 ￿
* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿=￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿) ￿￿ ￿￿￿ $ ￿4￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ E ￿ / ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿2 8 ￿
￿ ￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿: ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=4￿ ! ￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿, ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿4￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ / ￿
, ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿’ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ > ! ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿
$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=* ￿￿A ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿F ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿A ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿+￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿G 7 8 8 8 ￿H I I 9 J / ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿2 ;￿ * ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿=" ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿+￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿! $ ￿# ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿2 ￿￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿$% ￿& % ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿5 # ￿
( % ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿’ % ￿: ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ % ￿’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿$% ￿’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ % * + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ % ? % ￿
’ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=3 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ $ ￿* ￿ ￿￿% +￿￿ ) ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿
$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿4 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ % ￿$% ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=# ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿￿￿￿< ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿
) ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿* ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ $ ￿# ￿) ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ A ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿5 " ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=1 ￿ ￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
( ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿￿0 ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿$ ￿# ￿￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿# ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿& ￿9 ￿ ￿￿A ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿5 . ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿? % ￿$% ￿$% ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿: ￿ D ￿￿3 ￿ ￿E ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* % ￿3 % ￿3 % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ $ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿+￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿5 2 ￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* % ￿3 % ￿3 % ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿? % ￿$% ￿$% ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿=’ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿K ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿5 5 ￿
/ ￿ ￿ ￿= ￿￿ ￿ ￿ C ￿ ￿￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿=" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿- ￿ ￿￿ ￿ $ ￿
, ￿ ￿￿" ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿4￿/ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿5 8 ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿? % ￿$% ￿$% ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿=￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
% ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿* ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿" ￿￿ ￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿
B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ - ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿
+￿ ￿￿￿! ￿* ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿5 ;￿
& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( % ￿& ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿$% ￿& % ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* % ￿3 % ￿( ￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=# ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿! ￿￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ L ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿0 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿K ￿ 0 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿   ￿
0 ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿* 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿
* ￿ ￿ F ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿& ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
% ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿* 9 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿8 # ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ D ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿( ￿￿ 4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ 9 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: G ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿=# ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ $ ￿# ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ < ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ # % ￿: H ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ # % ￿: 8 ￿￿￿$￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿8 ￿￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿$% ￿& % ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=# ￿ ￿￿> ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿8 " ￿
B ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ A ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿+￿ ￿￿￿! ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿+￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿% ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿1 ￿0 ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿8 . ￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿$% ￿& % ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿* % ￿￿ % ￿& % ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿=, ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿8 2 ￿
$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿$￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿* + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿=# ￿+￿￿ ￿￿￿# ￿ ￿￿! ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿" ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿* ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 ￿￿￿￿" ￿
￿￿￿￿8 5 ￿
! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿$% ￿& % ￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿=, ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 0 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
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￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿